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I INTRODUCTION
In the absence of the application of any anti-avoidance measures,
foreign (ie non-South African source) income received by or accruing to
an offshore (non-resident') trust is only taxable in South Africa if it vests
in a resident beneficiary in the year in which it is received by or accrues to
the trust. This is the combined effect of s 25B and the 'gross income'
definition in s 1 of the Income Tax Act. 2 Section 25B of the Act provides
that if there is a beneficiary with a vested right to trust income it is taxed in
the beneficiary's hands and if there is no beneficiary with a vested right
the trust is taxed. However, in terms of the 'gross income' definition an
amount can only be included in a non-resident's gross income if it is from
a source within or deemed to be within the Republic of South Africa. It
is, in any event, a rule of international law that a non-resident can only be
taxed on local source income. 3 It follows that in the absence of
anti-avoidance measures residents could easily avoid tax on foreign
income through the utilization of offshore trusts. By shifting foreign
income-producing assets into an offshore trust and avoiding the vesting of
the foreign income in a resident beneficiary in the year that it is received
by or accrues to the trust, tax is avoided. If it is vested in that year in a
non-resident beneficiary no tax is payable. If it is not vested in anyone the
capitalized income can be remitted to a resident beneficiary as a tax free
capital receipt in a subsequent year.
When a fully-fledged residence-based tax system was introduced in
2001, 4 the legislature, mindful of the possibility of avoidance of tax on
foreign income through the use of trusts, enacted two provisions aimed
specifically at preventing such avoidance. They are sections 7(8) and
25B(2A) of the Act. 5 Section 9D of the Act is not applicable to offshore
* BA BCom (Honours in Taxation) LLB (Cape Town) DCLS LLM (Cantab); Professor of
Law, University of Cape Town.
I The term 'resident' is used in this article in the sense indicated by the definition of
'resident' in s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962.
2 Act 58 of 1962 hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'.
3 See, for example, R S J Martha The Jurisdiction to Tax in International Law (1989) 47; A
Knechtle Basic Problems in International Fiscal Law 36.
See the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000.
Similar provisions to s 7(8) and s 25B(2A) were included in the previous s 9D of the Act
which was introduced in 1997 and imputed 'investment income' of a 'controlled foreign
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trusts. Section 9D in broad terms, imputes the income of a foreign entity
to its South African 'owner(s)' if the foreign entity constitutes a
'controlled foreign entity' as defined in s 9D(1). A trust is expressly
excluded from the definition of a 'controlled foreign entity'. Section 9D
is essentially aimed at companies 'owned' by South African residents.
The objective of this article is to examine s 7(8) and s 25B(2A) with a
view to determining the extent to which Revenue has the means to
combat the avoidance of tax on foreign income through the use of
offshore trusts. The avoidance of tax on foreign capital gains is not
considered although it is to be noted that there are provisions in the Act
similar to s 7(8) and s 25B(2A) aimed at such avoidance.
6
II SECTION 7(8)
(1) The provision and its applicability to trust income.
Section 7(8) provides as follows:
'Where by reason of or in consequence of any donation, settlement or other
disposition (other than a donation, settlement or other disposition to a foreign
entity, as defined in section 9D, of a public character) made by any resident,
income is received by or accrues to any person who is not a resident (other
than a controlled foreign entity as defined in section 9D in relation to such
resident), there shall be included in the income of such resident so much of the
amount of any income as is attributable to such donation, settlement or other
disposition: Provided that any amount of income received by or accrued to
such person by way of foreign dividends, shall for the purposes of this section
be determined in accordance with the provisions of section 9E, as if such
person had been a shareholder who is a resident.'
It appears that in relation to offshore trusts7 s 7(8) is intended to apply
where a resident (hereafter referred to as 'the donor') makes a 'donation,
settlement or other disposition' and 'by reason of or in consequence of
such disposition income is 'received by or accrues to an offshore trust and
is either retained in the trust or is vested in a non-resident beneficiary of
the trust. Section 7(8) deems such income to be the donor's.
What is not clear is whether s 7(8) operates where the income vests in a
resident beneficiary. Section 7(8) operates where the income is 'received
by or accrues to' a non-resident. When income derived by the offshore
entity', which then included an offihore trust, to its South African 'owner(s)'. Sections 7(8) and
25B(2A) came into operation on 1 January 2001 and apply in respect of years of assessment
commencing on or after that date.
6 See para 72 and para 80(3) of the Eighth Schedule to the Act respectively. Para 80(3) was
added by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 60 of 2001.
7 Section 7(8) clearly does not only apply where an off-shore trust is involved which is
obvious from the fact that trusts are not referred to in s 7(8). However, there is no doubt that
s 7(8) targets offshore trust income.
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trust vests in a resident beneficiary has there been a receipt or accrual in
the hands of the trust for the purpose of s 7(8) giving rise to the operation
of the provision because the trust is a non-resident? It is true that by virtue
of the conduit principle (a principle enunciated by the courts prior to the
inclusion of a 'trust' as a 'person' in the definition of 'person' in s 1 of the
Act and the enactment of s 25B(1) and s 7(8))8 where trust income vests
in a trust beneficiary the trust is treated as a mere administrative
conduit-pipe and the beneficiary is treated as having a receipt or an
accrual of the income. However, does the conduit-pipe principle apply
for the purposes of s 7(8)? In s 25B(1) the legislature expressly envisages a
receipt or accrual in the hands of the trustee of a trust even though the
income has vested in a trust beneficiary.9 Section 25B(1) states that when
trust income arises it is received by or it accrues to the trustee irrespective
of any vesting of the income in any beneficiary. The provision then
proceeds to deem the income to be the beneficiary's in the case of a
vesting and the trust's in the absence of such vesting. However, such
deeming does not apply if any of the provisions of s 7 are applicable. 10
Does it not follow, therefore, that where income arises in an offshore trust
the requirement of s 7(8) of a receipt or accrual by a non-resident has
been satisfied? It is true that s 25B(1) refers to a receipt or accrual in the
hands of the trustee as opposed to the trust but does anything turn on the
distinction bearing in mind that the trustee is as much an administrative
conduit-pipe as the trust? Although it is submitted that the legislature's
intention was not to apply s 7(8) in circumstances where the offshore trust
income vests in a resident beneficiary legislative amendment is called for
for clarity purposes.
(2) 'Income'
In order for s 7(8) to apply, 'income' must be received by or accrue to
the offshore trust. It follows that if trust funds are invested in funds or
bonds or other instruments which confer no right to income, 1 s 7(8)
cannot apply.
1 2
Although s 7(8) is undoubtedly aimed primarily at foreign income it is
clear that it also applies to South African source income. Accordingly by
' See Armstrong v CIR 1938 AD 343; 10 SATC 1 and SIR v Rosen 1971(1) SA 172 (A); 32
SATC 249.
' Section 25B(1) provides that 'any income received by or accrued to or in favour of any
person during any year of assessment in his capacity as the trustee of a trust, shall, subject to the
provisions of section 7, to the extent to which such income has been derived for the immediate
or future benefit of any ascertained beneficiary who has a vested right to such income during
such year, be deemed to be income which has accrued to such beneficiary, and to the extent
which income is not so derived, be deemed to be income which has accrued to such trust.'
1 See the words 'subject to the provisions of section 7' in s 25B(1).
Referred to as 'roll-up' funds and 'wrap' bonds.
2 Nor can s 25B(2A) apply. See below.
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also applying to local income, s 7(8) appears to have a role additional to its
main role of ensuring the efficacy of the residence-based tax system. By
also applying to local income s 7(8) secures the taxation of the income at
the donor's marginal rate of tax and also facilitates the collection of tax
which can prove difficult where the recipient of the income is a
non-resident.
A possible flaw in s 7(8) which may nullify it completely is that
'income' as defined 13 is 'gross income' less exempt income, and 'gross
income' as defined 14 for a non-resident excludes income from a foreign
source. On this interpretation, therefore, s 7(8) cannot apply to foreign
income accruing to an offshore trust. It might be argued, however, that
'income' must not be given its defined meaning in the context ofs 7(8)15
but must be used in the wider sense of 'profits', irrespective of their
source. A case providing some support in this regard is CIR v Simpson, 16
in which the court held that the word 'income', as used in the equivalent
of s 7(2), had to be construed as meaning the profits and gains accruing to
the wife of a taxpayer and not income in the sense of gross income less
exemptions, as it is defined in the Act. A counter to this argument is that
the same defect existed in s 25(2A) i7 and the legislature saw fit to rectify it
there,18 but has not amended s 7(8), indicating that 'income' in s 7(8)
must be given its definition meaning.
Related to the question of what is 'income' for the purposes of s 7(8), is
the issue of the availability to the donor of the deductions and allowances
relating to the 'income' included in his or her income in terms of s 7(8). 19
For example, a resident donates a block of flats situated in London to an
offshore trust. In a particular year of assessment Rlmillion of rental
income accrues to the trust and the trust incurs R400 000 of expenditure
which would be deductible in terms of the Act in the ordinary course of
events. Is the donor taxed, in terms of s 7(8), on Rlmillion or Rlmillion
less R400 000, i.e. R600 000? Unfortunately there is no express provi-
sion in the Act that resolves this issue. The legislature has seen fit to deal
expressly with the treatment of deductions and allowances where income
accrues to trust beneficiaries in circumstances where the s 7 anti-
avoidance provisions do not apply 20 but not where it is deemed to accrue
to the donor in terms of s 7(8). 21 It will be recognized that if 'income' is
13 See s 1 of the Act.
4 See s 1 of the Act.
15 In fact in the context of s 7 as a whole.
16 1949 (4) SA 678 (A), 16 SATC 268.
17 See below.
18 See s 14(b) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 19 of 2001. See further below.
'9 This is an issue which also arises in relation to the other anti-avoidance provisions in s 7.
20 See s 25B(3).
21 Or in terms of any of the other provisions in s 7.
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given the meaning of 'profits' or 'gains' the problem could be solved
(albeit in a crude and unsatisfactory way) because expenditure is deducted
in arriving at a profit or gain.22 To tax the donor on the gross income
would obviously be highly inequitable and it is likely that in practice
Revenue will give the donor the benefit of the deductions and
allowances relating to the income. However, an amendment to the Act
expressly providing for this effect is called for.
(3) '[B]y reason of or in consequence of any donation, settlement or other
disposition'
Crucial to the application of s 7(8) is the meaning of the phrases
'donation, settlement or other disposition' and 'by reason of or in
consequence of. In order for a donor to be taxed in terms of s 7(8) the
donor must have made a 'donation, settlement or other disposition' and
'by reason of or in consequence of the disposition, income must accrue
to the offshore trust.
In terms of s 7(9) of the Act, a 'donation,' includes, in addition to a
completely gratuitous disposition, the disposal of an asset for a consider-
ation less than market value. It is unclear why the legislature saw fit to
make this inclusion 23 because this extension of its meaning had already
been clearly accepted by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. In
Ovenstone v SIR24 TroUip JA held that:
'the words "donation, settlement or other disposition" all have this feature in
common: they each connote the disposal of property to another otherwise
than for due consideration, i e otherwise than commercially or in the course of
business. "Donation" and "settlement" all have this further feature in
common: the disposal of property is made gratuitously or (occasionally in the
case of a settlement) gratuitously to an appreciable extent.'
As far as the meaning of the phrase 'other disposition', which is also
used in the other anti-avoidance provisions in s 7, is concerned, following
the above dictum, TrollipJA said:
'Since "disposition", the general word that rounds off the critical phrase, was
not intended to have its wide, unrestricted meaning, I think that this is an
appropriate situation in which to circumscribe its scope by extending that
common element of gratuitousness to it too by the ejusdem generis or noscitur a
sociis rule. The critical phrase should in other words be read as "any donation,
settlement or other similar disposition" So construed, "disposition" means any
disposal of property made wholly or to an appreciable extent gratuitously out
22 It does not, of course, solve the problem of'allowances' not involving any expenditure.
23 Section 7(9) was inserted in the Act by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000.
24 1980 (2) SA 721 (A), 42 SATC 55 at 74. See alsoJoss v SIR 1980 (1) SA 674 (T), 41 SATC
206 and C:SARS v Woulidge [1999] 4 All SA 519 (C), 62 SATC 1.
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of the liberality or generosity of the disposer. It need not flow from a unilateral
contract.'
On the basis of the judgments in the Ovenstone and Joss cases 25 it has
been accepted that 'other disposition' within the meaning of s 7 includes:
a disposal of an asset for a consideration appreciably lower than its market
value; an interest-free loan or a loan at an interest rate appreciably lower
than the market rate of interest; and allowing a purchase consideration to
remain outstanding interest free, or subject to the payment of interest at
an interest rate appreciably lower than the market rate of interest. 26
In order for s 7(8) to operate, income must be received by or accrue to
the offshore trust 'by reason of or in consequence of' the donation,
settlement or other disposition made by the resident. Thus there must be
a certain nexus between the income and the donation, settlement or
other disposition. It is noteworthy that, whereas the other anti-avoidance
provisions in s 727 use either the phrase 'by reason of or 'in consequence
of', s 7(8) uses both. The combination of both phrases indicates that a
very liberal interpretation of the nexus required by s 7(8) may be called
for and that the legislature intended the ambit of s 7(8) to be even wider
in this regard than the other anti-avoidance provisions in s 7.
In determining the nature of the nexus required by the anti-avoidance
provisions in s 7 other than s 7(8), the Appellate Division has held in
CIR v Widan28 that there must be some causal relationship between the
donation and the income in question and that in determining whether a
causal relationship exists, one must look not necessarily to the cause
which is proximate in time but to the real efficient cause of the income
being received. In addition, and of significance, is the Appellate
Division's acceptance of the donor's motive as an important factor in
ascertaining whether the necessary connection is present. In Widan's case
the court found that the donor's 'all-embracing design' in making the
donation was that it should give rise to the income in question which
'puts it beyond question that the income accrued by reason of the
donation'. The court accepted that:
25 At (n 24) above.
26 It is noteworthy that s 7(9) only enlarges on the meaning of'donation'. Accordingly, the
inclusion by the courts of interest-free and low-interest loans (cheap loans) within the meaning
of'other disposition' appears not to be affected by s 7(9). Ifs 7(9) was enlarging on the meaning
of'other disposition' it may well have been arguable that by including only a disposition for a
consideration less than market value, the implication was that 'cheap' loans were excluded, thus
rendering s 7(8) ineffective, and for that matter s 7(2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) too.
27 See ss 7(2)(a), 7(3), 7(5), 7(6) and 7(7).
28 1955 (1) SA 226 (A), 19 SATC 341 at 350.
REVENUE LAW
'[it] does not lie in a man's mouth to say that the consequence he deliberately
planned and procured is too remote for the law to treat as a consequence'.
29
What is stated in Widan's case is clearly applicable to the nexus
requirement in s 7(8).
In the light of the above, it appears that s 7(8) has the scope to apply in a
wide range of circumstances. For example, it could apply where a resident
arranges for an offshore trust to be formed which in turn forms an offshore
company in which the trust holds all the equity shares. 30 The resident
then makes an interest free loan to the trust which in turn makes an
interest free loan to the company and the company utilizes it to generate
foreign income. It is submitted that the foreign income generated by the
company will be deemed to be the donor's in terms of s 7(8).31 It is clear
that for s 7(8) to operate the income in question does not have to accrue
to the person to whom the interest-free loan is made, so it does not matter
that the income accrues to the company and not the trust. The issue here
is simply whether the income accruing to the company is 'by reason of or
in consequence of' the interest-free loan made by the donor to the trust.
Is the necessary nexus between the loan and the income present? It is
submitted that the nexus is present. The liberal approach to the
interpretation of the term 'by reason of adopted by the Appellate
Division in Widan's case described above, as well as the combination of
the phrases 'by reason of and 'in consequence of in s 7(8), could well
lead to this conclusion. If the court is satisfied that it was the donor's 'all
embracing design' 32 that his interest-free loan to the trust should be
'on-lent' interest free to the company in order to generate income in the
company's hands, it is unlikely that the court would find that this
consequence 'is too remote for the law to treat as a consequence'. 33 It is
unlikely that the 'on-lending' by the trust to the company will be viewed
as a novus actus interveniens which severs the connection between the loan
to the trust and the income accruing to the company.
What may also be of relevance here is the approach taken by the
Appellate Division in Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR34 which
might assist a court in the situation under scrutiny in inferring an
agreement between the resident and the trust that the resident made the
29 The quote is from Pollock Law of Torts 13 ed at 344 which the court approved of in Widan's
case (n 28) above at SATC 352.
3' The offshore company will accordingly not be a 'controlled foreign entity' within the
meaning of s9D of the Act and, accordingly, the income accruing to the company will not be
imputed to the resident by s9D.
31 Section 7(8) would clearly apply if the loan was made directly by the resident to the
company.
32 See Widan's case (n 28) above at SATC 352.
31 See Wdan's case (n 28) above at SATC 352.
" 1996 (2) SA 942(A); 58 SATC 229.
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loan to the trust on condition that the funds lent were on-lent by the trust
to the company. Such an agreement would clearly support the conclusion
that the income accruing to the company was 'by reason of or in
consequence of' the interest-free loan made by the resident. In Erf
3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR35 the court found that in addition to
certain written contracts there was an additional unwritten agreement
that had to be inferred and which gave rise to tax liability.
The 'on-lending' attempt to avoid s 7(8), described above, is a fairly
obvious one. However, other less obvious possibilities could be devised.
For example, a variation on the above situation is one where the resident,
instead of making the loan to the offshore trust, subscribes for redeemable
preference shares in the offshore company and the company lends the
proceeds of the issue interest free to the offshore trust which the trust uses
to generate foreign income. Is the resident to be taxed on that income in
terms of s 7(8)? It appears that the causation requirement ('by reason of or
in connection with') is satisfied for the same reasons given in relation to
the previous situation. In other words, the required nexus exists between
the subscription for the shares in the company and the foreign income
generated by the trust. However, has the resident made a 'donation,
settlement or other disposition'? Is the subscription for redeemable
preference shares in these circumstances a 'donation, settlement or other
disposition', assuming that a market-related coupon rate is stipulated for
in the terms of issue? If it is clear to a court that the company is simply an
empty shell with the inability to pay any dividend, would the court find
that there is the 'appreciable element of gratuitousness and liberality or
generosity' 36 required for the subscription for the redeemable preference
shares to constitute a 'disposition' within the meaning of 'donation,
settlement or other disposition'? Would the court conclude that the
resident has effectively made an interest free loan to the trust and ignore
the company on the basis that it is a party interposed between the resident
and the trust without serving any purpose other than tax avoidance?
The answer to these questions may depend to a large extent on
whether our courts follow the so-called 'Ramsay' approach to tax
avoidance, 37 which has sometimes been adopted in the United Kingdom.
The Ramsay approach to tax avoidance arose in the United Kingdom as a
result of the absence of a general anti-avoidance measure and the success
of many complex avoidance schemes, which led the courts
'... to adopt what in effect amounts to an alternative general anti-avoidance
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
" Named after the decision of the House of Lords in Ramsay v IRC [1982] AC 300.
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measure by changing their attitude to the application of tax statutes in
avoidance cases'.
38
The Ramsay approach in applying a provision of the tax legislation
involves the abandonment of the literal approach to tax avoidance
schemes and is one whereby the courts will look at a series of transactions
as a whole and not take each step at its face value. Where additional parties
or transactions have been interposed without serving any purposes other
than tax avoidance, the court, when adopting this approach, will ignore
the interposed party or transaction. The development of this approach has
been, as Morse says,
,uneven, with clear tensions between those judges who perceive their role as
the guardians of public finance and those who take a moral restrictive view of
their role'.
39
An example in the United Kingdom of the Ramsay approach is to be
found in IRC v McGuckian40 in which the shareholders of a company
transferred their shares to an offshore trust. The trust then assigned its
right to dividends about to be declared by the company to X for
consideration which amounted to 99 per cent of the value of those
dividends. On the face of it, whereas the receipt of the dividend in the
hands of the trust would have been taxable, the consideration received
was not. The House of Lords, in following the Ramsay approach,
ignored the interposed transaction and taxed the trust as if it had received
the dividend.
If the Ramsay approach was taken to the scheme in question it may be
possible for the court to ignore the interposed company and the
interposed transaction (the issue of the redeemable shares) and tax the
resident as if he or she had made a loan (or donation) directly to the trust.
In the absence of local jurisprudence dealing with offshore structures, it
is not inconceivable that South African courts may be swayed by foreign
judgments including those in the United Kingdom adopting the Ramsay
approach. The Ramsay approach has been applied in South Africa in
other areas. Thus in Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIR41 in an attempt to avoid the
provisions of paragraph (h) of the gross income definition, which includes
38 See G Morse 'Countering Tax Avoidance - The South African and United Kingdom
Experience' (1 998)JBL 217. See also A Derksen 1990 (107) SALJ 416 and 2002 Taxpayer 82.
39 Ibid.
40 [1997] STC 908. See also Burmah Oil v IRC [1984] STC 153; Furniss v Dawson [1984]
STC 153; Craven v White [1985] STC 531; Fitzwilliam v IRC [1995] STC 432; DTE Financial
Services Ltd v Wilson (Inspector of Taxes) [2001] STC 777. Cf Pigott v Staines Executors [1995]
STC 14; Griffin v Citibank Investments [2001] STC 1010; MacNiven v Westmoreland Investments
Ltd [1997] STC 1103; [2001] STC 237; 2001 [2] WLR 377 (HL).
41 (1998) 60 SATC 1.
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leasehold improvements in gross income, a scheme was entered into
which interposed a tax exempt body between the owner of the land and
the ultimate lessee. The issue was whether the owner had a right to have
improvements effected to the land which it had leased to a provident fund
which had, in turn, sub-let it in terms of a lease agreement which obliged
the sub-lessee to effect the improvements. The Supreme Court of Appeal
upheld Revenue's contention that the owner did have a right as envisaged
in para (h) and that the value of improvements fell into the owner's gross
income.
42
A further difference between the wording in s 7(8) and the other
anti-avoidance provisions in s 7 (in addition to s 7(8)'s use of both phrases
'by reason of' and 'in consequence of') is that the latter deem the income
which has the necessary nexus to the disposition to be the donor's,
whereas s 7(8) requires the necessary nexus and then goes on to include in
such person's income 'so much of the amount of any income as is
attributable to' 43 such disposition. It is doubtful whether anything turns on
this aspect of the difference in wording.
It is clear from CIR v Widan44 that, as in the case of the other
anti-avoidance provisions in s 7, s 7(8) can apply to 'income on income'.
In other words, if, for example, a resident made a donation to an offshore
trust and by reason thereof foreign investment income accrued to the
trust which was reinvested, generating further foreign investment
income, both the original investment income and the further investment
income could be included in the donor's income in terms of s 7(8).
Where a s 7(8) disposition is not completely gratuitous, the income
will have accrued by reason of or in consequence of both elements of
gratuitousness and consideration, in which case an apportionment is
necessary in order to give proper effect to the real efficient cause of the
income. 45 Thus if a resident sells his or her foreign income-producing
asset to an offshore trust for half of its market value, only half of the
foreign income accruing to the trust will be included in the resident's
income in terms of s 7(8). Where the assets are sold, as is very often the
case, to the trust at market value on interest-free or low-interest loan
account, an apportionment is required in terms of which the amount of
income to be included in the resident's income in terms of s 7(8) is limited
to the interest that would have been outstanding if interest at a reasonable
42 Ef 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR (n 34) above indicates 'an embryonic Ramsay
approach'. See Morse (n 38) above at 218.
13 Writer's emphasis.
44 See (n 28) above.
41 See Ovenstone v SIR 1980 (2) SA 721 (A), 42 SATC 55 andJoss v SIR 1980 (1) SA 674 (T),
41 SATC 206.
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rate of interest had been stipulated for.46 The same applies where the
resident makes an interest-free loan or low interest loan to the trust. The
hypothetical question to be asked is what interest rate could reasonably
have been charged on a loan of the currency that was actually lent. The
amount of income included in the resident's income in terms of s 7(8) is
then limited to that amount.
Where a disposition has given rise to income to which s 7(8) applies
and also a capital gain to which an attribution rule in Part X of the 8th
Schedule to the Act applies, the total amount of that income and gain
cannot exceed the amount of the benefit derived from that disposition.
47
For example, if a donation of R100 is made to the trust and the total sum
of the income and the capital gain attributable to the donation is R120,
only R100 thereof can be attributed to the donor. The amount of the
benefit derived from the disposition is R100.48 What is not clear is how
much of the R100 is to be treated as income and how much as capital
gain. This is an important question because of the different tax treatment
of income and capital gains. An equitable method of resolving the issue
would be to apportion the R100 in the ratio that the attributable income
and capital gain bear to the R100. So, for example, if the income in
question is R80 and the capital gain R40 the portion of R100 that will be
attributable to the donor as income would be R66,66 and the portion
attributable as a capital gain, R33,33.
49
It is noteworthy from a tax planning point of view that the sale of the
assets at market value on interest free loan account is more advisable than
an outright donation. Apart from the donations tax implications of an
outright donation, it is likely that all flows of income thereafter (until the
resident's death or emigration) will be construed as being 'attributable' to
the donation and accordingly taxable in the resident's hands in terms of
s 7(8). On the other hand, in the case of 'cheap' loans, no donations tax is
payable and, as far as s 7(8) is concerned, its applicability can be
terminated through repayment of the loan. Section 7(8) also cannot
operate in respect of income in excess of the outstanding notional
46 See Joss v SIR; C SARS v Woulidge (n 24) above. In Woulidge's case it was decided that in
making the apportionment, the in duplum rule has no application, which means that the
notional amount of uncharged interest is not limited to the capital amount of the loan.
" Para 73 of the Eighth Schedule. 'Benefit' means 'the amount by which the person to
whom that donation, settlement or other disposition was made, has benefited from the fact that
it was made for no or an inadequate consideration, including consideration in the form of
interest' (para 73(2)).
4 In the case where there is no donation but an interest free or low interest loan the benefit
appears to be the amount of interest that the recipient of the loan would have had to pay having
regard to a notional market-related rate of interest. This is what seems to be implied in the
definition of'benefit' in para 73(2) where reference is made to a disposition made 'for no or an
inadequate consideration, including consideration in the form of interest'.
49 80 x 100 40 x 100
0 - 66,66 and _ _ 33,33120 120
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interest. Sight must, however, not be lost of the possibility of Revenue
applying the transfer pricing provision 50 so as to deem the resident to have
received a market-related rate of interest on the loan.
(4) Residency requirement
Section 7(8) is only applicable if the donation, settlement or other
disposition was made by a resident. This raises the question whether s 7(8)
can apply where a person prior to becoming a resident made a donation,
settlement or other disposition and by reason of or in consequence
thereof foreign income accrues to an offshore trust after the person
becomes a resident. In other words, does s 7(8) only apply if at the time
the disposition was made the person making it was a resident? It will be
recognized that, if the narrower interpretation is the correct interpreta-
tion, it would be simple for an immigrant to South Africa to avoid the
application of s 7(8) by donating his or her foreign income-producing
assets to a discretionary offshore trust prior to becoming a resident. 51
It is submitted that s 7(8) is ambiguous in this regard and being a
provision designed to prevent tax avoidance a court may give it its wider
meaning. As stated by Botha JA in Glen Anil Development Corp Ltd v
SIR,52 the contra fiscum rule of interpretation does not apply to tax
avoidance provisions and they should be interpreted
'... in such a way that it will advance the remedy provided by the section
and suppress the mischief against which the section is directed.' 5 3
If the disposition giving rise to the operation of s 7(8) was an
interest-free or low-interest loan and the loan is still outstanding when
the non-resident becomes a resident, it is arguable, on the basis that the
loan is a continuing donation, that s 7(8) becomes applicable once
residence status is attained. In CIR v Berold54 HoexterJA held:
'When the taxpayer sold and transferred a large number of valuable assets
to Luzen, he did so on credit and without charging interest on the
purchase price. In effect he lent a substantial sum of money to Luzen, and
as long as he refrained from compelling Luzen to repay that sum, there
was a continuing donation by him to Luzen of the interest on that loan.' 55
It must also be borne in mind that in these circumstances, no matter
what form the disposition takes, if foreign income accrues to the offshore
trust and is not distributed in the year of accrual, but is retained and
50 Section 31(2) of the Act.
s Donations tax is not payable on donations made by non-residents. See s 54 of the Act.
s2 1975 (4) SA 715 (A).
13 At 727-28.
4 24 SATC 729.
" At 735-36 (writer's emphasis).
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capitalized, it is possible that s 7(5) of the Act may operate and deem the
income to be the immigrant's in that year.
Section 7(5) of the Act provides as follows:
'If any person has made a donation, settlement or other disposition which is
subject to a stipulation or condition, whether made or imposed by such person
or anybody else, to the effect that the beneficiaries thereof or some of them
shall not receive the income or some portion of the income thereunder until
the happening of some event, whether fixed or contingent, so much of any
income as would, but for such stipulation or condition, in consequence of the
donation, settlement or other disposition be received by or accrue to or in
favour of the beneficiaries, shall, until the happening of that event or the death
of that person, whichever first takes place, be deemed to be the income of that
person.
It is not an express requirement of s 7(5), as it is in s 7(8), that the donor
must have been a resident at the time the donation was made and it is
difficult to see how such a requirement can be implied.
What is contentious regarding s 7(5) is whether the exercise of a
discretion is an 'event' as contemplated by s 7(5). The issue remains
controversial although the Appellate Division, in Estate Dempers v SIR,
5 6
despite finding it unnecessary to decide the issue, nevertheless found
some force in arguments made by counsel for the taxpayer in support of
the view that in the context of a provision similar to s 7(5) such an
exercise of a discretion was not an event. It may of course be, and this is
very likely, that it is stipulated in the trust deed that the trust is to come to
an end after a fixed time, in which case the arrival of the date of
termination will be an 'event' for the purposes of s 7(5) and there will be
no need for Revenue to argue that the exercise of the discretion is an
event.
57
It is also noteworthy that s 7(5) cannot apply if the income is
distributed by the trust to a trust beneficiary in the year that it accrues to
the trust. So, in order to avoid the application of s 7(5) and s25B (which
would apply if the trust beneficiary was a resident), the immigrant could
arrange for the income to be distributed to a non-resident (for example an
offshore company or another offshore trust).
If the donor is a resident when the disposition was made and then
ceases to be a resident, can s 7(8) continue to operate in respect of such
person? It is clear that it cannot operate in respect of foreign income but
what is the position if it is local income? The words in s 7(8) 'there shall be
included in the income of such resident' perhaps indicate that the donor
56 1977 (3) SA 410(A).
57 This is in effect what happened in Estate Dempers v SIR 1977 (3) SA 410 (A) and also in
SIR v Sidley 1977 (4) 913 (A).
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must be a resident at the time when the income is included in his income
in terms of s 7(8). However, clarification is called for.
If Revenue is not able, for the reasons given above, to tax the
immigrant in terms of either s 7(8) or s 7(5) and capitalized income is, in a
year subsequent to the year of accrual to the trust, distributed to the
immigrant or some other resident beneficiary, s 25B(2A) may apply.
Section 25B(2A) is dealt with below.
(5) Retrospectivity
It is not clear whether s 7(8) applies to dispositions made prior to its
commencement. 58 Revenue apparently takes the view that s 7(8) does
apply. In support of the view that it does not apply is the fact that the
legislature has seen fit to provide expressly that s 7(7) applies to
dispositions made prior to its commencement.
59
(6) Recovery of tax
As in the case where the 'donor' is taxed in terms of s 7(3), (4), (5), (6)
or (7), the 'donor' who is taxed in terms of s 7(8) may recover the tax paid
from the offshore trust in terms of s 90(c). The rationale behind these
anti-avoidance provisions is not to penalize the donor but to tax the
income at the 'donor's' marginal rate of tax.
(7) The proviso
The proviso in s 7(8) ensures that the donor is afforded the same
treatment regarding foreign dividends as he or she would have if he or she
had been a shareholder of the company distributing the dividend income
referred to in the proviso.
(8) Disclosure
Any resident who makes any donation, settlement or other disposition
contemplated in s 7(8)60 is required to disclose that fact in writing to the
Commissioner when submitting his return for the year in which the
disposition is made and at the same time furnish such information as may
8 Section 7(8) came into operation on 1 January 2001 and applies in respect of years of
assessment commencing on or after that date. Its predecessor, s 9D(3) came into effect on 1 July
1997.
" Section 7(7) expressly applies to dispositions made prior to the commencement of 'the
Act' but, as has been pointed out, the necessary implication is that it applies to dispositions made
prior to the commencement of the section. See D Clegg and R Stretch 'Income Tax in South
Africa' (Butterworths) para 17.3.7.
6 And also in any other provision in s 7.
be required by Revenue for the purposes of the section. 61 The
implication of the wording of s 7(10) is that the disclosure of dispositions
made prior to its commencement 62 is not required.
Failure to comply with the disclosure obligation in s 7(10) can lead to
criminal sanctions. 63 Default can also lead to the raising of additional
assessments in terms of s 79 of the Act and also to the falling away of the
three-year limit on re-opening assessments laid down by s 79.64
Section 7(8) is not a provision that, like s 103(1) (the general
anti-avoidance provision), must be invoked by Revenue in order for it to
operate. Section 7(8) operates of its own accord and requires the taxpayer
to disclose the income that is deemed to accrue to him in terms thereof It
appears therefore that the disclosure obligation imposed by s 7(10) does
not really create any new obligation that did not exist prior to the
enactment of s 7(10). Section 7(10) simply reinforces a pre-existing
obligation and also 'sweeps away any possible plea for mitigation based on




The other specific anti-avoidance provision aimed at the avoidance of
tax through the use of offshore trusts is s 25B(2A).
Section 25B(2A) provides as follows:
'Where during any year of assessment any resident acquires any vested right to
any amount representing capital of any trust which is not a resident, and -
(a) such capital arose from -
(i) income received by or accrued to such trust; or
(ii) any receipts and accruals of such trust which would have consti-
tuted income if such trust had been a resident
in any previous year of assessment during which such resident had a
contingent right to such income or receipts and accruals; and
(b) such income has or receipts and accruals have not been subject to tax in
the Republic in terms of the provisions of this Act,
such amount shall be included in the income of such resident in such year of
assessment.'
61 See s 7(10) of the Act which came into operation on 1 January 2001 and applies in respect
of years of assessment commencing on or after that date.
62 Ibid.
63 See s 75 and s 104 of the Act.
64 The general rule is that an assessment cannot be raised in respect of an amount more than
three years after the year of assessment in which the amount should have been assessed. The
general rule, however, does not apply if, inter alia, there has been non-disclosure of material
facts. See s 79(1)(i).
65 See (2002) Tax Shock: Trust Save/Cost Tax? BSP Seminars 36.
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Section 25B(2A) is aimed at the accumulation by an offshore
discretionary trust of foreign income beyond a year-end with the idea that
it will be distributed as a capital and, accordingly, non-taxable award to a
resident beneficiary. The trust being a non-resident cannot be taxed on
the income. Section 25B(2A) overrides any possible argument that when
the accumulated income vests in the beneficiary it is of a capital nature
and therefore not taxable.
(2) 'Income'
As in the case of s 7(8), 'income' must be received by or accrue to the
trust and, accordingly, if the trust funds are invested in funds or bonds or
other instruments which confer no right to income ('roll-up' funds and
'wrap bonds'), s 25B(2A) cannot apply.
Section 25B(2A) does not suffer from the same possible flaw that s 7(8)
might suffer from, namely that it cannot apply to foreign income.66 When
s 25B(2A) was first introduced it did have this defect but this was
rectified.67 The wording of s 25B(2A)(a)(ii) now makes it clear that
s 25B(2A) applies to foreign income. Section 25B(2A) is, however, not
only applicable to foreign income. It is clear from s 25B(2A) (i) that it also
applies to South African source income. However, as in most instances
such income will be 'subject to tax' in South Africa in terms of the other
provisions of the Act, it will be excluded by s 25B(2A) (b).
At first blush the reference to 'any previous year of assessment' in
s 25B (2A)(a) indicates that s 25B(2A) can apply to a foreign amount that
was received by or accrued to the trust in a year prior to the coming into
effect of s 25B(2A). 68 However, in terms of s 25B(2A)(a)(ii), the provision
can only apply to such a receipt or accrual if it would have constituted
income if the trust had been a resident at the time of the receipt or accrual.
Accordingly, s 25B(2A) cannot apply to pre-1 January 2001 receipts and
accruals because, being non-South African source, they would not have
constituted 'income' at that time.
69
(3) No double taxation
It is clear from s 25B(2A)(b) that if the accumulated foreign income has
been subject to tax in South Africa in terms of s 7(5) or s 7(8) of the Act it
cannot be taxed again in terms of s 25B(2A). Double taxation is therefore
66 See above.
67 By s 14(b) of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 19 of 2001.
68 Section 25B(2A) came into operation on 1 January 2001 and applies in respect of years of
assessment commencing on or after that date.
69 At that time the 'gross income' definition did not distinguish between residents and
non-residents and a requirement of the definition was that the receipt or accrual had to be from
a South African source or deemed to be from a South African source.
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averted. Accordingly, it will only be in those circumstances where the
pre-conditions for the operation of s 7(5) and s 7(8) (for example, that
there has been a donation, settlement or other donation) have not been
met, that s 25B(2A) will come into the picture.
(4) No choice
It is submitted that ifs 7(5) or s 7(8), as the case may be, has not been
applied to income in the year of its accrual to the trust, in circumstances in
which one or both of these provisions was applicable, Revenue will be
unable to apply s 25B(2A) to the accumulated income in a subsequent
year when it is distributed as capital. It was 'subject to tax' as required by
s 25B(2A) in the year of accrual to the trust and Revenue, accordingly,
does not have a choice whether to apply s 7(5) or s 7(8) in the year of
accrual of the income to the trust, on the one hand, or s 25B(2A) in the
year of distribution of the accumulated income, on the other.
(5) 'Contingent right'
For s 25B(2A) to operate, it is essential that the beneficiary in whom
the capital is vested had a contingent right to the income (that has been
capitalized and vested in him or her) in the year that it accrued to the
trust. 70 So, for example, if capitalized income is distributed to a trust
beneficiary who only became a trust beneficiary subsequent to the year in
which the income accrued to the trust, s 25B(2A) cannot operate.
It also follows that if an award is made to a beneficiary out of 'genuine'
capital as opposed to capitalized income, s 25B(2A) cannot operate. Care
will have to be taken to ensure that 'genuine' capital is identifiable as such
so as to prevent any dispute as to the source of an award, bearing in mind
that money loses its identity through commixtio. 7 1 Transferring all income
in the year of its accrual to another offshore trust may be a prudent way to
achieve this. The onus of proving that the distribution has been made out
of genuine capital is, of course, on the taxpayer.
72
What constitutes a 'contingent right' to income within the context of
s 25B(2A)? There is little doubt that the term is used in its technical sense
and in contrast to the term 'vested right' which is also used in s 25B(2A).
When all the investitive or operative facts which are necessary to create a
right have occurred then the right is said, in the technical sense, to have
vested. 73 By contrast where one or more of the investitive facts has
already happened, but one or more has not yet happened, and may never
happen, the prospective right is contingent in the technical sense of that
'o See s 25B(2A) (a).
71 Foreign trustees should obviously have s 25B(2A) brought to their attention.
72 See s 82 of the Act.
a See D V Cowen 'Vested and contingent rights' 1949 SALJ404 406.
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term.7 4 Thus in Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan75 Watermeyer CJ
observed that the word 'vest' is used 'to draw a distinction between what
is certain and what is conditional: a vested right is distinguished from a
conditional ight'. In Durban City Council v Association of Building
Societies76 the same judge pointed out that the word 'contingent' as
opposed to 'vested' 'is used to describe the conditional nature of
someone's title to the ight'. It thus follows that if a trust instrument
provides, for example, that the trust's income shall be accumulated and
distributed to a trust beneficiary when, for example, he or she gets
married, the trust beneficiary has a contingent right to the income. As the
investitive fact necessary to create the vested right, namely, getting
married, has not happened and may never happen, the right is contingent.
As Cowen says:
'Now, though it is true that during the period of pendency, while it
remains uncertain whether an inchoate and conditional title will be
completed, the expectancy of a benefit is strictly speaking merely in the
process of becoming a right, it is, nevertheless, expedient to continue to
use the well-known expression contingent (conditional, inchoate) right.
As we shall see presently, the expression is in fact frequently used in its
technical sense in some important branches of our statute law. Moreover,
as von Tuhr observes, popular usage in this regard is fully justified; for
when part of the title of a right has already occurred, the law may
reasonably, and generally does, regard the chance or possibility of an
eventual right as being sufficiently real to recognize and protect in various
ways, and such recognition and protection is, after all, characteristic of the
notion of a legal right.'
77
Section 25B(2A) is undoubtedly aimed primarily at discretionary
offshore trusts and this raises the vital question whether a beneficiary of
such a trust has a contingent right within the meaning of the provision.
Some commentators78 are of the view that the interest of such a
discretionary beneficiary may not be a 'contingent right' but more
properly described as a spes, ie a mere 'hope'. It is submitted that the
interest of a discretionary beneficiary is a 'contingent right' within the
meaning of s 25B(2A). As Honore and Cameron say:
79
'If, however, the trustee has a discretion not merely how but also whether to
pay income or distribute capital to the beneficiary the latter's right is merely
contingent. The same is true if the trustee has a discretion as to how much to
74 Ibid.
" 1940 AD 163at 175.
76 1942 AD 27 at 33.
77 See (n 73) above at 407-408.
78 See eg D Clegg and R Stretch 'Income Tax in South Africa' (Butterworths) para 17.3.8.
7' T Honore, E Cameron Honore's South African Law of Trusts 4ed Juta & Co Ltd) 473.
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pay or distribute. One advantage of this is that a merely contingent right is not
in general subject to income tax nor does it form part of the beneficiary's estate
for insolvency or estate duty purposes.'
80
(6) Avoidance of s 25B (2A)
A devious way of possibly avoiding the application of s 25B(2A) would
be to provide in the trust deed that no income may be awarded to a
resident beneficiary by the trust in the year that it accrues to the trust. The
argument could then be that when capitalized income is distributed to a
resident beneficiary, s 25B(2A) is not applicable because in the year that
the income accrued to the trust the beneficiary did not have a contingent
right to the income. It is submitted that on the current wording of
s 25B(2A), Revenue may have difficulty in applying the provision and
that legislative amendment may be necessary to close this loop-hole.
It may be that s 103(1) of the Act (the general anti-avoidance
provision) could be applied to such a ploy. It is clear that there is a scheme,
the effect and purpose 81 of which is to avoid normal tax, and the only real
hurdle which Revenue has to overcome is that it will have to prove8 2 that
the 'abnormality' requirement of s 103(1) has been satisfied. The
extraordinary fact that a resident beneficiary can only be awarded the
income once it has been capitalized may satisfy the court that the scheme
has created a right or obligation which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at arm's length, in which case the 'abnormality'
requirement will be met. 83 On the other hand if the liberal approach
taken by the Supreme Court of Appeal in CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd
(formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd)84 is adopted, Revenue may be unsuccessful.
In terms of thejudgment in that case, a taxpayer who sets out to achieve a
bonafide commercial objective can do so through a structure specifically
aimed at the avoidance of tax even though the contracts involved in such
structure create abnormal rights and obligations. Also in the taxpayer's
favour is the fact that the abnormality requirement in s 103(1) is expressly
required by the section to be viewed 'having regard to the circumstances
under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or
" Cases cited by Honore and Cameron in support are CIR v Sive's Est 1955 1 SA 249 (A),
1955 1 PH G1 (A); Est Munro v CIR 1925 TPD 693, 1 SATC 163; De Beer v CIR 1932 CPD
443, 5 SATC 287; Hulett v CIR 1944 NPD 263 269, 13 SATC 58; Burger v CIR 1956 1 SA 534
(W), 1956 1 PH T5 (W).
81 It must be borne in mind that once Revenue has proved that the effect is to avoid tax the
onus swings to the taxpayer to prove that the sole or main purpose was not to avoid tax (s
103(4)).
82 See CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 61 SATC 391; 1999 SA (4) 1149
(SCA) where it was decided that the onus of proving 'abnormality' is on Revenue.
" See s 103(1)(b)(ii).
84 See (n 82) above.
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carried out'. 85 Also, a special relationship between the parties must be
taken into account to give effect to the concluding words in s 103(1)(ii)
which refer to 'the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in
question'. 8 6 These requirements narrow down the ambit of what
constitutes abnormality in the particular circumstances and makes
Revenue's task more onerous.
(7) 'Trust'
For s 25B(2A) to operate the income must accrue to an offshore 'trust'.
The definition of 'trust' in the Act 87 provides that a 'trust' means:
'.. . any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered
and controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is
appointed under a deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a
deceased person.'
Whether a particular offshore institution meets the requirements of this
definition will depend on the facts. Of significance in this regard is
whether the so-called 'non-charitable purpose trusts' 88 constitute trusts
within the definition meaning. Certain jurisdictions, 89 for example the
Isle of Man,90 the British Virgin Islands, 9t Jersey, 92 the Cayman Islands
93
and Mauritius 94 recognize the establishment of a trust without ascertain-
able beneficiaries, but with a particular purpose (which need not be
charitable) stated in the trust instrument. An independent 'enforcer' is
usually appointed in the trust instrument. The main feature of such trust is
the lack of ascertainable beneficiaries rather than the ability to establish a
trust for a particular purpose (which may bear little resemblance to its true
purpose), and it is this characteristic that has attracted the business and
estate planning community. These trusts are widely utilized to disguise
and obfuscate ownership of assets and other structures. An enlightening
comment on the usefulness of such trusts is as follows:
8 See Hicklin v SIR 1980 (1) SA 481 (A), 41 SATC 179.
86 See SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth &Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A), 33 SATC 113; CIR v Louw
1983 (3) SA 551 (A), 45 SATC 113.
8 See s 1.
88 Also known as 'STAR' trusts.
89 English law does not recognize non-charitable purpose trusts and this is one of the most
controversial issues in the contemporary trust scene. See P Baxendale-Walker 'Purpose Trusts -
the Definitive Discussion' (published by Butterworths, London).
90 See the Purpose Trusts Act 1996.
9' See s 584 of the Trustee Act.
92 From 24 April 1996Jersey Law recognized the creation of non-charitable purpose trusts.
" The Cayman Islands has the so-called STAR Trust regime. See A Duckworth STAR
Trusts (published by Gostick Hall Publications).
94 See the Offshore Trusts Act 1992.
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'During the trust period the assets can be, but do not have to be, applied
towards the purpose. Simply holding the assets in itself can be a purpose. At
termination of the trust, the remainder of the assets, if any, must be disposed of
in favour of the ultimate recipient. Considering that the enforcer could be
remunerated, various structures holding assets for ultimate recipients, with or
without payments at intervals during the duration of the trust and with the
benefit of insulation from beneficial ownership, can be envisaged. Funds
applied to the purpose during the duration of the trust could furthermore
indirectly benefit the ultimate recipient or anyone else who the trustees may
want to benefit, as long as the enforcer has no reason to believe that it is
contrary to the purpose. All of this makes the purpose trust a very flexible
planning tool.'
95
Whether a trust without beneficiaries could constitute a trust as
defined in our Act depends on whether the trustee can be said to be acting
in a fiduciary capacity, an essential requirement of the definition. The
trustee clearly has contractual duties but whether he or she is acting in a
fiduciary capacity depends on how widely the term 'fiduciary' is
interpreted.
96
It is noteworthy that if the purpose trust is not a trust as defined in the
Act, s 7(8) also cannot apply to income accruing to it or received by it. A
trust is not a juristic person 97 and, accordingly, if it is not a 'trust' as
defined and therefore not a 'person' as defined in the Act,98 s 7(8) cannot
apply.
In the context of the 'trust' requirement in s 25B(2A) it is relevant to
note that in certain circumstances Revenue may be relieved of having to
resort to anti-avoidance provisions in the Act. It may be able to prevent
the avoidance of tax by attacking the integrity of the trust. In other words,
Revenue may be able to have the trust set aside as a sham in which case
9s See E Cassell Maitland & Co http://www.maitlandco.com/article4.htm.
96 It is of interest that the definition of a trust in the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 is
wide enough to cover a purpose trust. It provides that:
"'trust" means the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one
person is by virtue of a trust instrument made over or bequeathed -
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered or disposed
of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the benefit of the person
or class of persons designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the
object stated in the trust instrument; or...'
The common law definition of a trust is also wide enough to cover a purpose trust.
According to Honore and Cameron (Honore's South African Law of Trusts by T Honore
and Cameron 4edJuta & Co Ltd at 3) 'a trust exists when the creator of the trust, whom
we will call the founder, has handed over or is bound to hand over to another the
control of property which, or the proceeds of which, is to be administered or disposed
of by the other (the trustee or administrator) for the benefit of some person other than
the trustee as beneficiary, or for some impersonal object'.
9' See CIR v Friedman and Others 1993 (1) SA 353 (A); 55 SATC 39.
98 The definition of'person' in s 1 of the Act includes a 'trust' as defined.
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the trust's assets will be regarded as still beneficially vested in the settlor of
the trust. Any 'trust' income will accordingly be the settlor's income and
no resort to any anti-avoidance measure will be necessary. In order for
Revenue to succeed in this regard the court will have to be satisfied that
the trust is a facade, that the settlor had no real intention99 to pass
ownership and control of his or her assets to the trustees. What is of
substantial importance in this regard is the fact that Revenue does not
bear the onus of proving that the trust is a sham. Revenue may simply
assess the settlor on the trust income and in order for the settlor to
successfully object to the assessment the onus provision in s 82 of the Act
would require the settlor to prove that the trust is genuine. 00
IV CONCLUSION
The extent to which the legislature has closed the door on attempts to
avoid tax on foreign income through the use of offshore trusts depends
largely on how widely the courts interpret the specific anti-avoidance
provisions, s 7(8) and s 25B(2A). It may also rest on legislative amend-
ments to these provisions to eliminate uncertainties and loopholes created
by the chosen wording. Elaborate structures combining offshore trusts
and offshore companies, sometimes in multiples, aimed at avoiding s 7(8),
s 25B(2A) and s 9D, are already very much in evidence and likely to
proliferate. Consequently, Revenue will have to use all the means at its
disposal if the residence based tax system is to be effective.
Success in applying s 103(1) may be hampered if the liberal approach
adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd
(formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd)10 1 is followed. The attitude exhibited by the
court in this case will also not inspire Revenue with much confidence in a
court adopting the Ramsay approach to tax-avoidance followed in the
United Kingdom, although cases such as Relier (Pty) Ltd v CIRI0 2 and Erf
3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd v CIR103 may raise Revenue's expectations.
Ultimately, the inadequacy of the anti-avoidance provisions in dealing in
certain cases with the ingenuity of tax planners may force Revenue as a
last resort to attack the integrity of the trust.
Regarding the intention to create a trust see Honore and Cameron (n 79) above at 96 ff.
o It is unnecessary for Revenue to have to resort to the court of the foreign country where
the trust was formed where the burden of proof is almost certainly going to be on Revenue and
where the integrity of the trust is likely to be vindicated. An example of a case where it was not
vindicated is Rahman v Chase Bank 1991 JLR 103 (Royal Court ofJersey).
10 See (n 82) above.
102 See (n 41) above.
113 See (n 34) above.
